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Night-Thoughts on Poe and Kant:
The Critique of Reason
John Dolis
1 Poe’s fascination with part/whole configurations plays itself out in several tales against
the background of hallucination and insanity. Regarding “Berenice,” for instance, the
“phantasma of  the  teeth”  exaggerate  the  part  in  its  configuration  with  her  facial
features as a whole:  “from the disordered chamber of  my brain,  […] the white and
ghastly  spectrum of  the  teeth,”  without  a  speck  or  shade  on  their  enamel,  or  “an
indenture  in  their  edges,”  would  not  “be  driven away”;  for  these  “I  longed with a
frenzied  desire”;  they  became “the  essence  of  my  mental  life  […].  I  felt  that  their
possession could alone ever restore me to peace,  in giving me back to reason.”1 In
“Eleonora,” both the voice and eyes surpass all understanding—her voice, sweeter than
“the  harp  of  Æolus,”  and  her  eyes,  brighter  than  the  “River  of  Silence,”
incomprehensible  “for  reasons which shall  be  made known” only  “in  Heaven” (653,
italics mine). Here, facial features portray the drama that assails narration’s drive to
understand  itSelf.2 These  features  enigmatically  emerge  as  phantasms  which
indefinably  equivocate  their  sense  and  thus  plague  reason’s  totalizing  need  to
comprehend  the  whole  of  things,  entities  which,  translated  to  the  psychoanalytic
arena,  characterize  the  drive  itself,  and  not  the  object,  as  partial  in  its  intrinsic
constitution.3 These emblematic phantasies of teeth, of voice, of eyes, establish reason’s
mise en scène and, in the self-same act, profoundly compromise its reach.
2 “Ligeia” stages this  event against  the backdrop of  aesthetic  theory where the eyes,
“those large,  those shining,  those divine orbs,”  provide the sole  “irregularity,”  and
serve to dislocate an otherwise perfectly  proportionate whole—“far larger than the
ordinary eyes of our own race […] even fuller than the fullest of the gazelle eyes of the
tribe  of  the  valley  of  Nourjahad”  (655).  The  scene,  with  all  its  histrionics,  fervidly
revolves around the “one,” the integer, integrity, the whole—and its relation to the
parts.  Over and against  the Greek ideal,  Ligeia’s  “features  were not  of  that  regular
mould which we have been falsely  taught  to  worship in  the  classical  labors  of  the
heathen”  (655).  While  they  approach  perfection  in  the  “faultless”  forehead,  the
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“purest” skin, the “gentle prominence” above the temples, the “raven-black” tresses,
the “harmoniously curved” nostrils, the “sweet” mouth, the “radiant” smile, the eyes
exceed, in their significance, the whole. They virtually transcend the Greek idea(l) in
their  affect.4 Narration finds  itSelf  obliged to  temper  understanding with  a  certain
supplement:
“There is no exquisite beauty,” says Bacon, Lord Verulam, speaking truly of all the
forms  and  genera of  beauty,  “without  some  strangeness in  the  proportion.”  Yet,
although I saw that the features of Ligeia were not of a classic regularity—although
I perceived that her loveliness was indeed “exquisite,” and felt that there was much
of “strangeness” pervading it, yet I have tried in vain to detect the irregularity and
to trace home my own perception of “the strange.” (655)
3 Put “beauty” in parentheses, as but an afterthought. And disregard entirely “The Poetic
Principle.”  Narration’s  path  roams  elsewhere  and  otherwise,  against  the  grain,
unhinged by “some strangeness in the proportion”—in other words, by the uncanny.
4 This  “strangeness” occupies  a  space that  borders  the disjunction between part  and
whole,  an  “irregularity”  in  light  of  which  consciousness,  bewildered  and  itself
estranged, irrevocably finds its self marginalized. In effect and affect equally, the part
transcends  the  whole,  equivocates,  prohibits  synthesis.  Amid  this  inhospitable
topography, the narrative degenerates. Consciousness misapprehends the very sense of
its  experience,  arrogated  by  some  “thing”  with  which  it  cannot  come  to  terms,
something which exceeds its grasp, something which borders, in the language of the
philosophical  milieu  that  frames  so  many  of  Poe’s  tales,  the  “sublime.”  Here  the
Enlightenment idea(l) of Reason furnishes the context in which narration finds itSelf
arrested, at a standstill, in the seemingly irrevocable divide between subject and object,
reflection and facticity.
* * *
5 Kant’s First Critique erects the theoretical machinery designed to heal this wound, the
divide between the object and the subject who “exposes” it, between the world and
consciousness—and, within consciousness itself, between the “concept” and the “idea.”
To begin, the a priori forms of intuition always already structure all experience within a
single, unitary “inner sense” (consciousness) and “outer sense” (objective reality)—to
wit, time and space. Understanding, in its turn, integrates experience into a unified
conceptual framework according to certain rules which a priori constitute empirical
reality, a unifying function grounded, in its own turn, in the unity of consciousness, a
formal  unity  characteristic  of  consciousness  itself—specifically,  self-consciousness,
what  Kant  calls  the  transcendental  unity  of  apperception.  In  short,  all  knowledge
“starts with the senses, proceeds from thence to understanding, and ends with reason,
beyond which there is no higher faculty to be found in us for elaborating the matter of
intuition and bringing it under the highest unity of thought.”5
6 Insofar as reason “secures the unity of the rules of understanding,” it provides “an a
priori unity by means of concepts, a unity which may be called the unity of reason,” a
unity whose purpose brings “the understanding into thoroughgoing accordance with
itself,”  a  unity  by  means  of  which  “the  understanding  is  determined  in  its
interrelations” as a whole.6 Or so it seems. A ghostly specter haunts this genial scenario
and  overshadows  reason’s  single-handed  custody  of  understanding.  Kant’s
Transcendental  Logic,  in  its  desire  to  apprehend synthetic,  a priori,  truth,  demands
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imagination for the possibility of such a synthesis.7 To the extent that reason needs
imagination, the transcendental synthesis is suspect from the start: truth harbors an
unseemly supplement, its haunt con-figured in “desire.” Imagination constitutes a most
uncanny guest  in  reason’s  timeless  home and bears  an  interest  which  inexplicably
contaminates this mise en scène.8 Poe’s “Ligeia” stages this event.
7 Kant further confounds things, attributing to reason an uncanny “interest” of its own.9
Its interest extends, above all, to examination of itself. In this account, it stands before
its  own  tribunal—judge  and  jury  both.  Given  the  Transcendental  Dialectic’s  own
“antinomies,” reason’s reach extends beyond phenomena and finds itself divided from
within, its own ideas at odds with its experience. Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic puts
in play an isomorphic unity with no relation to experience as such—speculation beyond
the reach of understanding, reason purely in its self-reflective character.10 Accordingly,
in their disseveration from empirical reality, Kant’s transcendental Ideas—and, at their
ultimate  remove,  the  Ideal—accommodate  the  purely  possible,  the  unconditional:
contradictions as justifiable concepts, concepts that transgress the limits of experience,
concepts  internal,  to  and consistent  with,  the  nature  of  reason as  a  whole.  Reason
understands itself so well that it acknowledges its contra-dictions as equi-valently true.
Nothing stands outside its “understanding” of itself.
8 Reason’s value thus played out in Kant’s Second Critique, devoid of all deception and
illusion, finally affords its own indemnity since speculation underwrites and guarantees
its own Idea(l): in other words, it takes no risks. Elsewhere and otherwise, as far as
reason figures in its own returns, to purloin an essential psychoanalytic dictum from
Lacan,  there  is  no  Other  of  the  Other.  Thus,  speculation  guarantees  a  risk-free
apparatus  that  discredits  any fracture,  any “fraction,”  of  the  whole;  it  discounts its
“irrationality,” while reason, in the interest of its “practice,” in the practice of morality,
its duty, seeks to plug the holes (of happiness, its own desire). Reason, as a (w)hole, thus
freely capitalizes on what’s right; yet, in the “mean” time, reason’s own desire returns
as speculation’s specter, that which haunts the stage and steals the scene.
9 To borrow from Pascal, the heart has reasons of which reason itself knows nothing. And
as desire has reasons of its own, reason, conversely, courts its own desire. Reason, by its
own account, wants nothing of desire—and, as a rule, it wants totality, the whole. To this
effect, it bears an interest of its own. While this is its desire, desire thus reasons that it
wants to end; once it obtains the thing it wants, it will be full, fulfilled; it will no longer
want; it will be whole. Desire’s own raison d’être, then, is to plug its hole(s), to end, to
end its being as (nothing but) a hole in subjectivity. The logic of tautology—in other
words,  coincidence—ends  here  as  well,  where  it  begins.  There  is  no  outside  to  this
circularity. Reason needs no other than its self, already othered in those contradictory
truth(s) which guarantee, in turn, the truth of its account. This innermost (dis)union at
the heart of rationality, its Kern (to borrow from Freud), this ratio that paradoxically
both constitutes and,  at  the same time,  circumscribes the One,  here designates the
differance,  to  call  upon  the  deconstructive  glossary,11 the  moment  in  which  reason
differs from itself, (de)parted, from within, between the faculty of understanding and
the (speculative)  possibility of  wholly understanding its  self,  the very moment that
denies  to  reason  the  unity  upon  which  it  insists.  Poe’s  “Usher”  relocates  this
fractionality in the fracture that sustains the Usher house, the very fissure which leads
to its disintegration in “the end.”
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10 In both “Ligeia” and “The Fall of the House of Usher,” the narrative is undone from the
start. “Ligeia” ends where it begins, collapses back upon itself, timelessly beguiled by
the ideal. “Usher,” in its own way, (re)enacts a comparable demise, the narrative itSelf
inexorably driven by—and partial to—what, in the end, will be a self-sufficient, self-
enclosed totality. Reason’s drive, in its deliberate and liberated sense, is wholly partial
in  the end.12 Reason drives  its  self  insane by its  insistence on the whole.  Given its
configuration at the heart of consciousness, the (primal) scene of reason, with its brute
insistence on totality and universal truth, is itself illusory, imaginary in Lacanian patois
(not to mention Kant), and, at its limit, harbors the irrational, the price of its desire. In
what follows, I’ll further inosculate—that is, confound and confuse—these deliberations
on reason with a certain psychoanalytic inflection, night-thoughts (to re-sound Edward
Young)  presented as  a  series  of  meditative  moments,  musings,  introspections,  self-
analyses.  In  their  speculative  design,  these  unruly  ruminations  militate  against
elucidation  and  explanation,  but  rather  accommodate  the  specular  as  such,
speculation’s  own  specter.  To  this  end,  I  frame  the  theoretical  foundation  of  my
subsequent  musings  on  Poe  within  that  most  uncanny  in-stance  that  exposes  an
abysmal rift residing purely within reason’s all-inclusive self-reflection vis-à-vis which
nothing stands outside, and leave all speculation on how comprehensively Poe read his
Kant, and its purposiveness in certain tales, to those who find a sense of solace in their
extrication of the plum of authorial intention.
* * *
11 “Ligeia” inscribes reason’s critical fracture in its very plot by reconfiguring the rational
and the empirical as a reversible gestalt.  In “the end,” they meet, fated to coincide,
identical: to wit, Ligeia’s (eternal) return or the return of the repressed, whichever you
prefer, in the transfigured body of Rowena. Ideal and real converge: the “metaphysical”
Ligeia and the “practical”—a marriage made not in heaven, but through “thirst of gold”
(660)—Rowena. In the “mean” time, the narration finds itSelf translated from the Rhine
to England. It would appear that, from beginning to end, the narrative has time on its
hands, passing (away) from the site in which narration, “[b]uried in studies of a nature
more  than  all  else  adapted  to  deaden  impressions  of  the  outward  world”  and
simultaneously illuminated by “metaphysical investigation” and “the many mysteries
of the transcendentalism in which we were immersed,” originates—“some large, old,
decaying city near the Rhine”—to that in which it terminates, “an abbey […] in one of
the  wildest  and less  frequented portions  of  fair  England,”  an abbey whose “savage
aspect” and “gloomy and dreary grandeur” reflect “the feelings of utter abandonment
which had driven me into that remote and unsocial region of the country” (654, 657,
654, 660).13
12 Consciousness will undermine this timeliness—the narrative, as such, the product of a
mind disjointed by hallucination, always already completed, a self-enclosed totality, the
very mirror of madness. From the outset, it bites the tail of its tale and swallows itself
whole: there is no outside to the tale. In retrospect, the narrative embraces contra-
diction in its untimely origin: the self-exposition of reason, the very exposition of the
subject  itself,  surfaces  as  suspect  at  the  dawn of  consciousness.14 The primal  scene
speaks for its self: 
I cannot, for my soul, remember how, when, or even precisely where, I first became
acquainted with the lady Ligeia. Long years have since elapsed, and my memory is
Night-Thoughts on Poe and Kant: The Critique of Reason
Journal of the Short Story in English, 62 | Spring 2014
4
feeble  through much suffering.  Or,  perhaps,  I  cannot  now bring these  points  to
mind, because, in truth, the character of my beloved, her rare learning, her singular
yet placid cast of beauty […] made their way into my heart by paces so steadily and
stealthily progressive, that they have been unnoticed and unknown. (654) 
13 So “steadily” does narration pace itSelf, so “stealthily,” indeed, that time falls from its
hinges as narration steals its self—a self entirely Othered in itself.
14 This stolen moment now commemorates a fracture in the narrative that will not heal—
reason stalled, immobilized. Desire is on the outside looking in. The “strangeness” of
Ligeia’s  eyes,  at  last  “referred  to  the  expression,”  fits  no-thing  in  the  world:  “how
frequently,  in  my intense  scrutiny of  Ligeia’s  eyes,  have I  felt  approaching the  full
knowledge of their expression […] yet not quite be mine […]. I found, in the commonest
objects of the universe, a circle of analogies,” objects such as a rapidly growing “vine,”
a  “moth,”  a  “butterfly,”  a  “chrysalis,”  the  “ocean,”  a  falling  “meteor”  (656,  italics
mine).  Nothing  in  the  real  world  wholly  corresponds  to  that  singularly
disproportionate, excessive part of the idea(l) which, in the end, transcends experience.
To this, narration, forced to find itSelf within the looking glass, discovers it within the
other’s  own desire—to which it  gives its  self  away,  its  own desire:  “the learning of
Ligeia was immense”; her “acquisitions […] were gigantic,  […] astounding; yet I  was
sufficiently  aware  of  her  infinite  supremacy  to  resign  myself,  with  a  child-like
confidence, to her guidance […]. With […] how much of all that is ethereal in hope did I
feel, as she bent over me […], that delicious vista by slow degrees expanding before me”
(657).
15 Reciprocally, the narrative idea(l), dissevered from reality, gives up itself as well, must
suffer, must endure its end. Time gives itself away at last: at length, “I beheld my well-
grounded expectations take wings to themselves and fly away” (657). Death interrupts
the plot, and puts the tale at risk—the very narrative as such; for with the death of the
idea(l), so goes the subject who supports it. It’s not by chance the subject, in this very
moment, finds its self idealized in the other, mirrored as a whole: “in death only was I
fully impressed with the strength of her affection. For long hours, […] would she pour
out  before  me  the  overflowing  of  a  heart  whose  more  than  passionate  devotion
amounted  to  idolatry”  (658,  italics  mine).  Reason  works  at  full  capacity  when
rationalizing itself.  Thus follows the removal  of  the story to  the “other” side where
reason will stand face to face with the (im)possible,  the unconditional:  it  wills itself
thus.
16 A change of scenery reflects the contradiction at the heart of this event, and harbors, in
its  own  “remove,”  that  Kern of  consciousness  which  would  identify  itself  with  the
idea(l): the “gloomy and dreary grandeur” of the abbey purchased in England, “with its
verdant  decay  hanging  about  it,”  dissimulates  the  incoherent  opulence  within—the
“gorgeous and fantastic draperies,” the “solemn carvings of Egypt,” the “wild cornices
and furniture,” the “Bedlam patterns of the carpets of tufted gold” (660). Thus, while
the inside and the outside are at odds, the inside contradicts itself as well. To further
magnify the anarchy within, a single part, a room, will supplement the scene. In its
phantastic constitution, the bridal chamber exceeds the “regal magnificence” of the
abbey as a whole, “pentagonal in shape,” vaulted “with the wildest and most grotesque
specimens of a semi-Gothic, semi-Druidal device,” a “Saracenic” censer, “[s]ome few
ottomans  and  golden  candelabra,  of  Eastern  figure,”  a  bridal  couch  “of  an  Indian
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model,”  and a  “gigantic  sarcophagus […]  from the tombs of  the kings over  against
Luxor” (660-61).
17 Add now a further depth to this mise en abyme, a part within the a(part)ment itself: “in
the  draping  of  the  apartment  lay  alas!  the  chief  phantasy  of  all”—irregular  and
disproportionate  in  keeping  with  the  (w)hole,  yet  consonant  with  the  narration’s
failure to deliberate, to liberate the thing and equally the whole of things:15
The lofty  walls,  gigantic  in height—even unproportionately so—were hung from
summit to foot, in vast folds, with a heavy and massive-looking tapestry—a tapestry
of a material which was found alike as a carpet on the floor, as a covering for the
ottomans and the ebony bed, as a canopy for the bed and as the gorgeous volutes of
the curtains […]. The material […] was spotted all over, at irregular intervals, with
arabesque  figures  […].  But  these  figures  partook  of  the  true  character  of  the
arabesque only when regarded from a single point of view. By a contrivance now
common,  and indeed traceable  to  a  very remote period of  antiquity,  they were
made changeable in aspect. To one entering the room, they bore the appearance of
simple  monstrosities;  but  upon  a  further  advance,  this  appearance  partially
departed; and, step by step, as the visitor moved his station in the chamber, he saw
himself surrounded by an endless succession of the ghastly forms which belong to
the superstition of the Norman, or arise in the guilty slumbers of the monk. The
phantasmagoric  effect  was  vastly  heightened  by  the  artificial  introduction  of  a
strong  continual  current  of  wind  behind  the  draperies—giving  a  hideous  and
uneasy animation to the whole. (661)
18 Self-sufficient in its arabesque design, the room precludes its own identity, collapsed
upon itself and subject solely to that animation which accounts for its uncanny drift.
19 Here  subjectivity  might  drift  as  well,  void  of  its  “single  point  of  view.”  The  scene
requires no opium; it harbors misperception on its own—Rowena having heard sounds
which “I could not hear” and having seen motions “which I could not perceive” (662).
The narrator, in turn, senses a shadow “of angelic aspect,” some-thing in reality that
might  be  no-thing,  something  “fancied  for  the  shadow of  a  shade”  (663).16 And  so
occurs  the  final  double-cross,  what  must  “have  been but  the  suggestion of  a  vivid
imagination”: as Rowena “was in the act of raising the wine to her lips, I saw, or may
have dreamed that  I  saw,  fall  within the  goblet  […]  three  or  four  large  drops  of  a
brilliant and ruby colored fluid. If this I saw—not so Rowena” (663).
20 The affect, in turn, turns logic on its head, turns into an effect that functions as (the
shadow of) a cause: “her menials prepared her for the tomb” (663). Yet time will not
give itself up so easily. Rowena seemingly returns to life, a “barely noticeable tinge of
color”  along  her  cheek;  but,  once  again,  “the  usual  rigorous  stiffness  immediately
supervened” (665). The scene recurs “time after time,” in countless variations, “until
near the period of the gray dawn” (665). Little wonder that narration hastens to its
death: “Let me hurry to a conclusion” (665). Why the rush?
21 In its  resurrected form, the narrative idea(l),  embodied in the beautiful  Ligeia,  and
Rowena’s loathsome physical reality always already coincide. Reason’s own integrity
requires that it justify contradiction, accommodate the (im)possible, the unconditional
—a crisis of reason that necessitates the self-same ending as “Morella,” here turned
inside-out.  Every-thing  (re)turns  to,  and  revolves  around,  those  eyes—that  point
imaginary in which consciousness defers itself, and yet without which consciousness is
at a total loss.
22 The tale reflects this differance which interosculates subject and object, and destabilizes
each within itself and in each other equally, a transcendent, yet subversive, moment in
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which desire (re)presents its own (im)possibility—to plug its hole, wholly fulfill its self.
Understanding can know no-thing of this scene: desire, as Lacan argues, is a metonymy.
Here, the uncanny plays its hand, its part. The “strangeness” of Ligeia’s eyes, “referred
to the expression,” (mis)represents a disproportion at the heart of reason’s innermost
integrity, a part that doesn’t figure in “numerically,” that carries over as remainder, as
a supplement. It re-marks reason’s own excess, where reason would exceed itself, the
part  de-parted  now—and  whole:  enough  to  drive  a  subject  mad.  Reason’s  haunt  is
haunted by this ghost: desire sneaks in the back door at this point.17 “What was it? I was
possessed with a passion to discover” (656, italics mine). No wonder that the dead return
to life; no wonder that narration, in the end, itSelf a blank, transfixed amid “a mad
disorder in my thoughts,” stares into empty space, into the “black,” the “full,” the fully
uninhabited, unoccupied “wild eyes—of my lost love—of the Lady—of the Lady Ligeia”—
in the transfigured body of Rowena (665, 666).18
* * *
23 I’ll enter, by the front door, reason’s most definitive, ethe-real abode, the hideaway of
reason’s  monarchy,  to  further  speculate  on  things.19 Such  speculation  brings,  not
unexpectedly,  the  specular,  the  specter  back  to  life.  Some-thing  in  the  very
“contemplation”  of  the  Usher  house  unnerves  the  narrative:  “It  was  a  mystery  all
insoluble”  (231).  Things  repudiate  their  sense;  they  contradict  themselves.  The
composition of the house itself attests to an incongruous integrity; it’s sick at heart, its
Kern: 
I scanned  more  narrowly  the  real  aspect  of  the  building.  Its  principal  feature
seemed to be that of an excessive antiquity […]. Yet all this was apart from any
extraordinary  dilapidation.  No  portion  of  the  masonry  had  fallen;  and  there
appeared to be a wild inconsistency between its still perfect adaptation of parts,
and the crumbling condition of the individual stones. (233)
24 Not even individual parts are whole within themselves. Yet, inexplicably, beyond “this
indication of extensive decay, […] the fabric gave little token of instability” (233). To
further qualify this riven state of things, narration interjects a parenthetical aside: 
Perhaps  the  eye  of  a  scrutinizing  observer  might  have  discovered  a  barely
perceptible fissure, which, extending from the roof of the building in front, made
its way down the wall in a zigzag direction, until it became lost in the sullen waters
of the tarn. (233)
25 The fissure of this narrative “perhaps” unwittingly exposes, in reality, the universal
state  of  things  within  the  Usher  “house”—both  edifice  and  family  line—and
correspondingly  engenders  an  “utter  depression  of  soul,”  an  “iciness,  a  sinking,  a
sickening of the heart” (231).
26 Sick at heart, and given to “an unredeemed dreariness of thought, which no goading of
the imagination could torture into aught of the sublime,” narration finds itSelf unable
to  account  for  things;  the  house  refuses  to  expose  the  reason  for  the  all-inclusive
“sense” of illness and disorder since its first appearance in consciousness: 
I  was forced to fall  back upon the unsatisfactory conclusion, that while,  beyond
doubt, there are combinations of very simple natural objects which have the power
of  thus  affecting  us,  still  the  analysis  of  this  power  lies  among  considerations
beyond our depth. It was possible, I reflected, that a mere different arrangement of
the particulars of the scene, of the details of the picture, would be sufficient to
modify, or perhaps to annihilate its capacity for sorrowful impression. (231)
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27 It doesn’t help to turn things upside down: “acting upon this idea, I reined my horse to
the  precipitous  brink  of  a  black  and lurid  tarn  that  lay  in  unruffled  lustre  by  the
dwelling, and gazed down—but with a shudder even more thrilling than before—upon
the remodelled and inverted images” (231).
28 Recount those moments most divisive in the tale, yet, for the moment of the tale itself,
moments that remain intact: the Usher house is cracked, “perhaps”; the family line is
split in two—or doubled, should you choose to understand things differently—by twins.
Things  generally  endure  a  synthesis  while  everything  disintegrates  “internally,”
collapses from the weight of its “within.” Even the season corresponds to this scenario:
it’s fall. The Usher house epitomizes reason as a (w)hole, the whole externally secure(d)
and yet internally unsound, fractional. Narration frames this scene, secures its borders
so that nothing inside might seep out while, at the same time, nothing from without
seeps in—a frame-up not unlike the Usher “house” itself, both manse and family line
alike. In other words, the narrative will mimic both the Usher house and line in this
regard.
29 Return now to the tarn. Confused and searching for a “different arrangement of the
particulars  of  the  scene”  while  poised  outside,  and  at  a  distance  from  the  story  it
recounts,  the narrative already finds itSelf—inside the tarn, the tarn that ultimately
swallows every-thing—as integral to everything it apprehends but fails to comprehend.
Thus, having reined the horse close “to the precipitous brink” (precipitously close, so
close, in fact, narration cannot help but see itSelf), reflection here exposes both the
house and narrator within a single frame, the narrator con-fused, now an essential part
of the prefigured scene which will expose, in turn, the house before he ever enters it.20
Let’s not tarnish this event by questioning reflection’s own veracity, its exposition in
this “black and lurid tarn”—inverted, upside-down no less.
30 On close assay—that is, to “the eye of a scrutinizing observer” (from which narration
surreptitiously excludes itSelf with its signatory “perhaps”)—only when the narrator
looks up, directly at the house, to apprehend its “real aspect,” does it appear in its
insolvent totality, reminiscent of “the specious totality of old wood-work which has
rotted for long years in some neglected vault, with no disturbance from the breath of
the external air” (233). In itself, the image of the house reflected in the tarn exposes but
a solitary part, excessive in its isolated singularity: its “vacant and eye-like windows”
(231). These vacant windows “figure” in the narrative account of Roderick’s “head,”
and play their (counter)part within the house, where Roderick, sick in head and heart
alike,  inveterately ill,  a  fraction of  himself,  succumbs to what the narrator terms a
“deficiency, perhaps, of collateral issue, and the consequent undeviating transmission,
from sire to son, of the patrimony with the name”: to wit, “the entire family lay in the
direct line of descent” (233, italics mine).
31 Incest so identifies “the patrimony with the name” that one collapses on the other;
both coincide so as “to merge the original title of the estate in the quaint and equivocal
appellation of the ‘House of Usher’—an appellation which seemed to include, in the
minds of the peasantry who used it, both the family and the family mansion” (232). If
not  literal,  incest  iconically  re-marks  the  site  at  which  disintegration  has  always
already taken place, a state where both the “inside” and the “outside” coincide, a state
wherein  these  “twins”  will  meet,  within  the  narrative  itSelf,  eventually as  One. 21
Precisely here, reason totters on her throne, about to fall (apart).
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32 Correspondingly,  the incitation of  a  poem ironically  interrupts—to mirror,  and thus
mimic—the tale itself, narration’s very prose. This piece disrupts, within the recitation
of “The Fall,” the récit’s uni-form-ity and hence integrity, wherein “the monarch”—that
is,  Reason—“Thought’s  dominion,”  fully  in  accord  with  “a  lute’s  well-tuned  law,”
capitulates to “Vast forms that move fantastically/To a discordant melody” (239). And
this, in turn, returns narration to those phantasies which threaten Roderick’s mind,
ideas which had, “by dint of long sufferance,” obtained an “influence” over his “spirit,”
over “the morale of  his  existence”—ideas regarding “some peculiarities  in the mere
form  and  substance  of  his  family  mansion”  (235).  Aligned  with  his  “distempered
ideality,”  hellish  in  its  bent,  casting  “a  sulphureous lustre  over  all,”  Roderick’s
“disordered  fancy”  now  invests  the  mansion’s  very  stones  with  both  a  mood  and
sentience of their own:
The conditions of the sentience had been here, he imagined, fulfilled in the method
of collocation of these stones—in the order of their arrangement […] above all, in
the long undisturbed endurance of this arrangement, and in its reduplication in the
still waters of the tarn. Its evidence […] was to be seen […] in the gradual yet certain
condensation of an atmosphere of their own. […] The result was discoverable, he
added, in that silent yet importunate and terrible influence which for centuries had
moulded the destinies of his family, and which made him what I now saw him—what
he was. (236, 239)22
33 It’s not by accident, but by coincidence, that the “arrangement” of the parts, in their
relation to the whole, recirculates narration’s opening scene: “I had so worked upon my
imagination as really to believe that about the whole mansion and domain there hung
an atmosphere peculiar to themselves” (233). Turning things once more, this mutual
arrangement  mirrors  reflection’s  own  isomorphic,  self-enclosed  mise-en-scène as
mirror-like  itself.  Notice,  equally,  that  Roderick’s  own disordered mind projects  an
ordered, mirror-like reality: both mansion and family line, house and housed, object
and  subject,  outside  and  inside  seamlessly  coalesce,  their  mutual  relationship  a
foregone synthesis.23
34 In  general,  Poe’s  “critique”  of  reason,  for  the most  part,  situates  part/whole
configurations at the “tell-tale” heart of rationality, a problematic that addresses the
very nature of reason in its absolute demand for unconditional totality,  its need to
order things, to determine the position of parts relative to one another, and, in the end,
to  comprehend  a  whole  which  unconditionally  circumscribes  the  parts  in  their
entirety. While “Ligeia” exposes the mechanism of a mind whose operations typically
(dis)place  a  part  “outside”  the  whole,  a  part  that,  in  its  own  immensity  and
disproportionality, exceeds the whole, a fetish, if you will, residing, somehow, beyond
the  reach  of  logic,  “literally”  outside—a  part  that  might  be  (mis)taken  as  sublime
—“Usher,” on the other hand, at its most (in)decisive boundary, collapses on the part/
whole problematic, reconfiguring the border “line” of reason as a (w)hole: specifically,
where reason draws the line itself, the very line that demarcates and circumscribes the
subject’s own identity (Kant’s “consciousness”) and, at the same time, “separates” it
from the world, the self-same line that generates and shelters its integrity, its sanity.24
Reality  itself  requires  this  difference,  the  border  that  conjoins  (in)difference  and
identity  and,  in  a  different  sense,  the  subject’s  differance from  its  self.  It’s  not  for
nothing that, ahead of things, the epigraph, the head of this tale, bespeaks its tail, its
very end, the final circum-stance that will befall the story line: “Son cœur est un luth
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suspendu ; / Sitôt qu’on le touche il résonne.”25 If nothing else, the tale de-lineates a
study in disintegration and the dissolution of this (border) line.
35 Incest  constitutes  a  metaphor for  the “unspeakable,”  the paradigm of  reason at  its
(tauto)logical extreme, where inside and outside coincide, collapse upon each other as a
whole, as one, “identical” (although the Usher twins, uncannily, are not). There is no
outside  for  the  Usher  twins.  To  this  effect,  the  thoughts  that  ultimately  annex
Roderick’s own disordered mind reflect no “world” without, without exterior; rather,
they (re)present a world without “without,” without an outside of its own—the product
of the house alone, and its “silent yet importunate and terrible influence which for
centuries had moulded the destinies of his family, and which made him what I now saw
him—what he was” (236, 239). Here house and patrimony verge upon the subject at its
vanishing point, the point at which the (mise-en) scene will finally dissolve (the whole
of) itself,  will  finally dissolve itself whole. Unthinkable, it  spells the end of reason’s
reign. It’s not by chance, therefore, that the “reality” exposed by the narration ends
within the tarn where it began; nor is it any accident the ending coincides with the
narration’s earlier conception of the mirror-like relationship between the sentience of
the house and its reduplication in the tarn. Reason (re)configures the collapse of house
and family line as “one,” and figures in its own demise as well.
36 The  narrative  itSelf  stands  on  this  brink,  the  mouth  that  eats  itself,  and  mirrors
Roderick’s own (dis)solution: “I felt creeping upon me, by slow yet uncertain degrees,
the wild influences of his own fantastic yet impressive superstitions” (241). And so it
happens that, upon interring Madeline, despite her cataleptic past, the pair make doubly
sure they’ve “screwed down the lid” and then “secured the door of iron” (241). One
needn’t question logic here (it points to murder, sane or not, for reasons that remain
unspecified). From here on, Roderick morphs into a ghost, attuned to “some imaginary
sound” while, at the same time, the narration similarly struggles with itSelf, begins to
fall away, apart: “I struggled to reason off the nervousness which had dominion over
me. […] But my efforts were fruitless. An irrepressible tremor gradually pervaded my
frame” (241).
37 An “other” story now dis(inter)rupts the story line, a tale intended to defer the fall of
“lofty reason upon her throne” (237),  “the ‘Mad Trist’  of  Sir Launcelot Canning”—a
pharmakon, as the narrator reasons, having nothing closer at hand, intended to fight
reason’s impending dissolution with “the extremeness of the folly which I should read”
(243).  In  other  words,  the  narrative  attempts  to  normalize  extremes  with  extreme
measures of its own, measures that undo all measurement and that, ironically, lie
nearest to hand. And so begins the final “fall,” not of the house or family line, but of the
story line itself, the story as a whole.
38 Abysmally, the tale collapses on itself. Having reached that point in the story of the
“Trist” where Ethelred uplifts “his mace outright, and, with blows […] in the plankings
of the […] door so […] that the noise […] alarumed and reverberated throughout the
forest,” there comes “from some very remote portion of the mansion […] what might
have been, in its exact similarity of character, the echo […] of the very cracking and
ripping  sound  which  Sir  Launcelot  had  so  particularly  described”  (243).  And,  once
more, as the dragon in the “Trist,” having been struck upon the head, gives up “his
pesty breath” with a shriek “so horrible and harsh, and […] piercing,” the narrator,
beyond all doubt, does “actually hear […] a low […] but harsh, protracted, and most
unusual  screaming  or  grating  sound—the  exact  counterpart  of  what  my fancy  had
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already conjured up […] as described by the romancer” (243-44, italics mine). And, for a
final  time,  as,  in the “Trist,”  the shield falls  to the floor “with a mighty great and
terrible ringing sound,” the narrator becomes distinctly aware, no sooner “had these
syllables passed my lips,”  of  a  “hollow, metallic,  and clangorous […] reverberation”
(244).
39 Three points of incidence preclude the possibility of chance. As Roderick condenses
things: “the breaking of the hermit’s door, and the death-cry of the dragon, and the
clangor of the shield—say, rather, the rending of her coffin, and the grating of the iron
hinges of  her  prison,  and her struggles  within the coppered archway of  the vault”
(245). “Completely unnerved,” narration stumbles to its feet, identified now with the
“other” it disclaims as Roderick shrieks the sentence that befalls them both: “Madman! I
tell you that she now stands without the door” (245). The shoe fits seamlessly the other foot.
26
40 Now enter, from without, the lady Madeline, within: enter the departed one: “reeling to
and fro upon the threshold,” she “fell heavily inward upon the person of her brother,
and in her violent and now final death-agonies, bore him to the floor a corpse, and a
victim of the terrors he had anticipated” (245).27 Here integration and disintegration
coincide. Here, at the Usher line’s extremity, its end, there’s every reason to believe that
Madeline  returns.  Speculation  guarantees  as  much,  incorporates  negation,
contradiction, the im-possible as part of its domain.
41 As for the story line as such, bereft of any difference between the story within the story
and the story as a whole, the narrative re-cites its own demise, the fall of “The Fall of
the  House  of  Usher.”  It  reflects,  in  other  words,  the  disintegration  of  its  self,  self-
enclosed  and self-sufficient  to  “The  End,”  the  recitation of  its  end included in  the
narrative itSelf.28 Or so it would appear.
42 And  yet  the  narrative  itSelf  escapes  in  time:  “[f]rom  that  chamber,  and  from  that
mansion, I fled aghast” (245). Now comes good sailing—a.k.a., the bona fide death-bed
scene. Take it on faith:
The storm was still abroad in all its wrath as I found myself crossing the old cause-
way. Suddenly there shot along the path a wild light […]. [T]he vast house and its
shadows were  alone behind me.  The radiance  was  that  of  the  full,  setting,  and
blood-red moon, which now shown vividly through that once barely discernable
fissure. […] While I gazed, this fissure rapidly widened—there came a fierce breath
of the whirlwind—the entire orb of the satellite burst at once upon my sight—my
brain  reeled  as  I  saw  the  mighty  walls  rushing  asunder—there  was  a  long
tumultuous shouting sound like the voice of a thousand waters—and the deep and
dank tarn at my feet closed sullenly and silently over the fragments of the “House of
Usher.” (245)
43 One needn’t doubt the final sense of things, the fragmentation that accomplishes the
absolute de-parture of the “House.” The whole amounts to nothing in the end. The
whole,  its  unconditional  totality,  belongs  to  non-being,  to  death—and  death  alone.
Death constitutes the (w)hole in every-thing—call it “desire,” if you prefer.
44 Nor need I call attention to the stutter-step narration takes, its re-citation dashed—and
at an end as well.29 In “the end,” what is the narrative if not a “fetish” in itSelf that
drives, and yet exceeds, the whole? What’s left over from the narrative amounts to
speculation’s own returns, its “interest.” The narrative itSelf ostensibly recovers from
this scene, returns, like Madeline—remaindered from the dead—but as a supplement,
the ghost of reason as a whole, speculation’s ownmost specter, “shadow of a shade,” the
Night-Thoughts on Poe and Kant: The Critique of Reason
Journal of the Short Story in English, 62 | Spring 2014
11
solitary witness to an inexplicable event. All speculation ends with this: “the deep and
dank tarn at my feet closed sullenly and silently over the fragments of the ‘House of
Usher.’”30 The moment is, of course, sublime.
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NOTES
1. Edgar Allan Poe, The Complete Tales and Poems of  Edgar Allan Poe (New York: Vintage, 1975),
646-47. Subsequent quotations from Poe are parenthetically cited in the text.
2. I  deploy the neologism “itSelf” in its reflexive sense to emphasize that the narrative act—
narration in itself—implies a subject capable of not only reflection but also duplicity—that is,
otherness.  Call  it  the  unconscious  of  the  text,  an  unconscious  that  never  and  in  no  way
underwrites  intentionality.  Narration  might  deceive,  might  contradict,  its  self.  This  textual
unconscious bears the mark of differance in deconstructive terms. Distinct from the “narrator,”
narration  itSelf  is  always  and  everywhere  genderless—an  “it,”  neither/nor,  neuter(ed).  The
narrator is but a “part” of the narration as a (w)hole: the narrative event itself excompasses the
exposition of narration’s drive as such, the silhouette of its desire.
3. See Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, trans. Alan Sheridan (New
York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 185: “The phantasy is the support of desire; it is not the object that is
the support of desire.”
4. For a reading of Poe’s tales as parody of idealism, see Joan Dayan, “Poe, Locke and Kant” in Poe
and His Times:  The Artist and His Milieu,  ed. Benjamin Franklin Fisher IV (Baltimore: The Edgar
Allan Poe Society, 1990), 30-44.
5. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason,  trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1965), 300.
6. Kant, 303, 305.
7. Kant, 133: “The synthesis of apprehension is […] inseparably bound up with the synthesis of
reproduction. And as the former constitutes the transcendental ground of the possibility of all
modes of knowledge whatsoever—of those that are pure a priori no less than of those that are
empirical—the  reproductive  synthesis  of  the  imagination  is  to  be  counted  among  the
transcendental acts of the mind.”
In the second edition of the First Critique (1787), Kant, most unpredictably, elides imagination,
deferring its juris-diction to the “understanding” (a rose by any other name) as that faculty,
bearing  an  immediate  relation  to  intuition,  which  synthesizes  apprehension.  Here,  the
Transcendental Deduction, in its equi-vocation of imagination and understanding, confers the
power of synthesis entirely upon the concept. Yet, more importantly, perhaps, the disappearance
of imagination from the transcendental unity of consciousness prohibits the possibility of a non-
conceptual world related to apperception and, hence, no “outside” outside consciousness itself—
inside  and  outside  thus  collapsed,  they  coincide.  I’ll  have  recourse  to  resurrect  this  notion
regarding the conclusive fall suggested in “The Fall of the House of Usher.” Uncannily, Kant’s
Third Critique brings back imagination from the dead, not unlike the resurrection and return of
Madeline.
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8. See James Luchte, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (London: Continuum, 2007), 56; indeed, while
Kant “casually writes that the convergence of the idea and the concept is a focus imaginarius, an
imaginary point,” any inclusion of imagination, “even one that was a priori and transcendental,
would infect the eternity of reason with temporality” (144, 146).
9. Kant, 635: “All the interests of my reason, speculative as well as practical,  combine in the
following three questions: 1. What can I know? 2. What ought I to do? 3. What may I hope?”
Moreover,  in the interest of addressing these inquiries,  reason stipulates that it  reflect upon
itself.
See Pauline Kleingeld, “The Conative Character of Reason in Kant’s Philosophy,” Journal of the
History of Philosophy, 36.1 (1998), 77-97: reason “needs to present itself to itself in the process of
gaining clarity about its own workings” (97, italics mine).
10. Regarding this transcendent employment of the pure concepts of reason, Kant understands,
by the Idea, “a necessary concept of reason to which no corresponding object can be given in
sense-experience. Thus the pure concepts of reason […] are transcendental ideas” and “overstep
the limits of all experience” (Kant, 318-19).
11. See Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1973), 129-30: “The verb ‘to differ’ [différer] seems to differ from itself […]. In the
one case, ‘to differ’ signifies nonidentity; in the other case it signifies the order of the same […].
We provisionally give the name differance to this sameness which is not identical:  by the silent
writing  of  its  a,  it  has  the  desired  advantage  of  referring  to  differing,  both as  spacing/
temporalizing and as the movement that structures every dissociation.”
12. For an opposite perspective, cf., for example, John H. Timmerman, “House of Mirrors: Edgar
Allan Poe’s ‘The Fall of the House of Usher,’” Papers on Language and Literature 39.3 (Summer 2003),
227-44: “Poe did not reject Enlightenment thinking, […] he was in fact suspicious of the newer
Romanticism […] [W]e can observe the theory for unity, symmetry, and harmony emerging from
Eureka […] in ‘The Fall of the House of Usher’” (229).
For a take on “Usher” that affirms such universal correspondence over and against the context of
Locke's “Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” see Beverly R. Voloshin, “Explanation in ‘The
Fall  of  the  House  of  Usher,’”  Studies  in  Short  Fiction 23.4  (Fall  1986),  419-28:  “This  perfect
adaptation of the parts of the Usher world is made absolute in the ending of the tale […]. Poe sees
the possibility of  contact  between mind and whatever is  external  to it  in the unstringing of
Roderick’s  sensations  and  in  the  dissolution  of  the  boundary  of  appearance.  Hence  […]  the
dissolving consciousness of Roderick and the decaying world of Usher are brought into complete
union” (427-28).
For an opposing view, cf. G. R. Thompson, “Locke, Kant, and Gothic Fiction: A Further Word on
the Indeterminism of Poe’s ‘Usher,’” Studies in Short Fiction 26.4 (Fall 1989): 547-50. Thompson
argues that the end is indeterminate, and that Gothic fiction, in general, “repeatedly enmires
itself  in the epistemological  swamp of  ‘appearances,’  which are not necessarily  connected to
things, and which may simply be subjective impositions” (549-50).
Elsewhere, Thompson analyzes “Usher” in light of issues dealing with the opposition between
reason and irrationality,  and their  relationship,  in general,  to the Gothic genre—Poe’s  Fiction:
Romantic Irony in the Gothic Tales (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973).
13. This sentiment echoes Kant’s own indictment of empiricism as barbaric.
14. In Kant’s own scenario, precisely insofar as and to the extent that consciousness projects the
“world,” the very act of representation carries with it the emergence of the subject to its self—
that is, self-consciousness.
15. Cf. Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper
and Row, 1971), 174, where, over and against Kant’s transcendental object and the rift between
phenomena and noumena,  the  “thing” (res)  becomes a  “gathering to  deliberate  on a  matter
under discussion, a contested matter,” a “matter for discourse.”
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16. For an extensive reading of the “thing” at odds with Kant—that is, nothing, or no-thing, as
the condition of  possibility for being,  for there “to be” experience,  cf.  Martin Heidegger,  An
Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959).
17. So, too, morality insinuates itSelf into Kant’s installment of the Second Critique.
18. It remains to be exposed, in Poe, how the return of the dead mimics and mocks the flip-side
of Kant’s Reason in the Second Critique—that is, the Will in its relation to desire: “[a]n intensity in
thought, action, or speech was possibly, in her, a result, or at least an index, of that gigantic
volition which, during our long intercourse, failed to give other and more immediate evidence of
its existence. Of all the women whom I have ever known, she […] was the most violently a prey to
the tumultuous vultures of stern passion” (657).
19. For a reading of “Usher” that enters by the back door,  see Benjamin Franklin Fisher IV,
“Playful ‘Germanism’ in ‘The Fall of the House of Usher’: The Storyteller’s Art,” in Ruined Eden of
the Past:  Hawthorne,  Melville,  and Poe,  ed.  G.  R.  Thompson and Virgil  L.  Lokke (West Lafayette:
Purdue University Press, 1981), 355-74.
For a reading of “Usher” alongside Habermas’s account of the fall of reason in the history of
philosophy,  see Michelle  Boulous Walker,  “A Short  Story About Reason:  The Strange Case of
Habermas  and  Poe,”  Philosophy  Today 41.3  (Fall  1997):  432-45;  in  effect,  both  “Usher”  and
Habermas’s account constitute stories concerned “with identifying the dangers of a rationality
that goes beyond its rightful place” (432).
20. Reflection’s greatest danger is to lose itself. The tarn, here, mirrors and prefigures where
narration both begins and ends; it functions as a frame whose unity might be disrupted forcefully
from both the inside and the outside equally.  See Dennis Pahl,  “Poe’s Sublimity:  The Role of
Burkean Aesthetics,” Edgar Allen Poe Review 7.2 (Fall 2006): 30-49.
21. Cf. E. Arthur Robinson, “Order and Sentience in ‘The Fall of the House of Usher,’” PMLA 76.1
(March 1961): 68-81: “The lack of collateral issue does not prove incest, in fact would render a
general family inbreeding unlikely” (76).  How then account for Usher’s cryptic,  yet damning,
remark about this “malady”: it was “a constitutional and a family evil” (235, italics mine)?
22. For  a  gloss  on Usher’s  madness  as  a  form of  ecological  “environmental  pantheism,”  see
Matthew A.  Taylor,  “The Nature of  Fear:  Edgar Allan Poe and Posthuman Ecology,” American
Literature 84 (June 2012): 353-79.
23. This  isomorphic  reciprocity  mirrors  Kant’s  own  discourse  on  reason,  and  the  mutual
relationship between the concept and sensation in their spontaneous receptivity and receptive
spontaneity—a midpoint between the purely rational and the empirical as Heidegger explains in
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. See Luchte, 44.
24. For a parenthetical gloss on the part/whole configuration—as it tangentially relates to Poe’s
“Usher”—in light of Kant’s Third Critique and the sublime, contextualized by readings of Hegel
on aesthetics and fine art, and Paul de Man on “aesthetic ideology,” as well as other thinkers in
the continental tradition, see Susan Bernstein, “The Dome of the Mind: Monticello in Weimar,”
MLN 123.5 (December 2008): 981-1005.
25. See Louise J. Kaplan, “The Perverse Strategy in ‘The Fall of the House of Usher,’” in New Essays
on Poe’s Major Tales, ed. Kenneth Silverman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 45-64:
“The tale’s epigraph from De Béranger warns of a potential dissolution of the borders between
illusion and reality” (48).
26. Cf.  Jean Ricardou,  “The Story Within the Story,”  James  Joyce  Quarterly 18.3  (Spring 1981):
323-38:  “the  totality  of  the  story  is  […] only  the  dramatization  of  its  own operation”  (333).
Ricardou thus reads this narcissistic mise-en-abyme in light of one detail the inner tale omits:
“Roderick […] avoids recalling an essential peripeteia: the complete destruction, by Ethelred, of
the  dwelling  of  the  hermit”  (327).  Hence,  in  a  reciprocal  (in)version  of  my  own  reading,
Ricardou’s argument doubles back upon the part in its relation to the whole: “the mise en abyme
is before everything else the structural revolt of a fragment of narrative against the ensemble
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which it contains” (331). In Ricardou’s rendition, then, against my own, this one detail sets up the
narrative as narrative: it is presented as “the consciousness of the narrative by itself” (331). Yet I
recall  you to the “madness” that the outside narrative confirms—that,  “in reality,” Madeline
(re)turns. This completes the circle that initially inscribes narration’s own estrangement from the
“outside” of its tale, beginning from the time that it inserts itSelf within the tarn.
27. The narrative alleges this occurs on “the night of the seventh or eigth day after placing the
lady Madeline within the donjon” (241). It purely stands to reason: after seven or eight days in the
coffin, she’s incontestably dead—at least she was. Believe what you will.
For a variant rationalization of this event, see John C. Gruesser, “Madmen and Moonbeams: The
Narrator in ‘The Fall of the House of Usher,’” Edgar Allan Poe Review 5.1 (Spring 2004): 80-90: “as
bizarre  as  the  events  the  narrator  describes  are,  they  may  have  rational  (as  opposed  to
supernatural)  explanations,  as  implausable  as  these  may  be.  If  Madeline  is  cataleptic  and  if
Roderick suffers from pathological fear, then it is possible—at least within the realm of Poe’s
fiction—that  Madeline  may  not  have  been  dead  when  she  was  put  in  the  crypt  and,  after
struggling to free herself from her coffin and tomb, may have sought out the brother who buried
her alive” (84-85).
28. Cf. Leonard W. Engel, “The Journey from Reason to Madness: Edgar Allan Poe’s ‘The Fall of the
House of Usher,’” Essays in Arts and Sciences 14 (May 1985): 23-31: “The first sentence […] and the
description that follows are highly suggestive of a tightly closed, virtually airtight box,” serving
to  “deepen  the  effect  of  confinement  on  the  narrator,  as  though  he  were  on  the  verge  of
suffocation” (24).
29. Cf. Pahl, 39: “With the last remnants of the Usher house sinking from sight, one might easily
believe that the narrator finally begins to feel safe, whole, and secure, having passed through
terror and anxiety to achieve a higher, more detached state of Reason. However, his fragmented
language, emphasized by the multiple dashes and disjointed syntax in the tale’s last sentence,
only betrays his continued sense of psychological fragmentation, as he stands—his self doubled,
split, re-presented—before the mirror image of the ‘deep and dank tarn.’”
30. In passing,  note the quote within the quote,  the quotes put into play here at the end, a
consciousness  outside the narrative  itSelf  that  sites/cites/recites  narration’s  own decline,  its
dissolution, disappearance in the end—one that refers explicitly, or so it would appear, “perhaps,”
to the fall of the story (the “House of Usher”) itself. Is this Poe’s private joke?
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